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CONTENTS
• Since the fall of last year, EMU countries have experienced a slowdown in economic activity triggered by a decelera-
tion of exports. The expansion of internal demand has been more or less intact due to low interest rates and higher
terms of trade. Consumer confidence has continued to rise and business confidence seems to have stabilized in
early 1999. Economic activity in Euroland will gain momentum again in the course of 1999, mainly driven by domes-
tic demand. The increase in real GDP will amount to 2 percent in 1999 and 2.7 percent in the year 2000.
• Monetary conditions are currently very favorable and will support the upswing. The three-month money market rate
fell to 3.1 % following the concerted reduction of central banks' key interest rates in December 1998. Long-term in-
terest rates are extremely low; corrected for inflation, the rate for Euroland is lower than the long-term average for
Germany. In recent months, the growth rate of M3 has been somewhat higher than the reference value announced
by the ECB (4.5 percent); narrow money has expanded twice as fast as M3. In addition, the euro has devalued
considerably against the US dollar since the beginning of this year. Given the expectation that the slowdown in the
economy is only of temporary nature, the ECB will not loosen its policy further but keep its key interest rate at the
current low level for the rest of this year.
• The ECB decided to follow a medium-term strategy. Against this background, the current weakness in Euroland
does not imply a need for action. Low inflation is also no reason to cut interest rates because consumer prices have
been dampened by special factors, in particular the weakness of raw material prices, and not by a tight monetary
policy. If interest rates were lowered in response to this transitory change, they would have to be raised again as
soon as this effect fades away. Such a stop-and-go policy should be avoided. Likewise, the recent weakness of the
euro against major currencies does not suggest that interest rates should be raised. For very good reasons, the
ECB—as well as the American Federal Reserve Board—does not follow a target for exchange rates.
• According to the Stability and Growth Programs published by the governments, budget deficits in relation to GDP are
projected to decline from 2.3 percent in 1998 to 0.9 percent in the year 2002 in Euroland. As the Stability and Growth
Pact calls for a balanced budget or even a surplus over the medium term, fiscal policy is, in general, not yet on a
course compatible with the intentions of the Maastricht Treaty. Only in smaller countries fiscal policy is making prog-
ress, while consolidation in larger member countries is not sufficient.
• It has often been argued that it is necessary to harmonize VAT rates and particularly capital income taxation in the
EU in order to prevent a "race to the bottom", otherwise it would be impossible to supply an adequate level of public
goods and to finance the welfare state. However, the development of capital income tax rates in the EU and in other
industrialized countries does not provide evidence of a race to the bottom. But even if tax competition should be-
come fiercer, there are still arguments in favor of competition: If tax rates are cut in a process of competition, gov-
ernment expenditures will have to decline with the result that inefficiencies in the public sector will be reduced. Given
the high levels of government expenditures in most of the EU countries, there seems to be no risk that governments
would be unable to fulfill their specific functions. In addition, tax competition might help to find better tax systems,
and every country could learn from the experiences of other countries. In contrast, tax harmonization would probably
lead to higher taxes in the EU.
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in Euroland
The introduction of the new European currency
on January 1,1999 did not pose any major prob-
lems. The start of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) was thus successful. The challenge for
the European Central Bank (ECB) is — given
all the uncertainties of transition — to follow a
credible medium-term strategy. Only this will
allow the central bank to gain the reputation
which is beneficial for the stability of the price
level as well as of economic activity.
At the beginning of 1999, the EMU countries
experience a cyclical weakness which was
caused mainly by a deceleration of export
growth. While this is the consequence of the
crises in various countries of the world, internal
demand growth seems to be more or less intact
due to low interest rates and higher terms of
trade.
The current discussion on monetary policy
revolves around the question whether the ECB
should stimulate demand by further cuts in in-
terest rates. Such a short-run orientation which
is often vehemently propagated by politicians
runs counter to the main task of the ECB, name-
ly to assure a stable price level in Euroland.
These calls for action are even more implau-
sible as monetary policy has not at all been tight
but rather expansionary in the past.
Fiscal policy is subject to a controversy, too.
A condition for EMU is the Stability and Growth
Pact in which countries have promised to avoid
budget deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP. It
has become apparent that in 1998 there was
hardly any progress in consolidating the go-
vernment budgets. If this continues and if defi-
cits remain too high already at the beginning of
EMU, the confidence in fiscal policy will weak-
en considerably. In another area of intense dis-
cussion, many economists and politicians favor
a change in tax policies in Europe: After the
single monetary policy has been established,
taxes should be harmonized as well. Coordina-
tion and harmonization may have some appeal
to many observers. However, experience shows
that the results of such efforts of economic
policy may well be less competition and lower
growth.
I. Slowdown Triggered by
Export Weakness
In 1998, real GDP in Euroland expanded at an
accelerated rate of 3 percent (1997: 2.5 per-
cent). The upswing, however, considerably lost
momentum in the course of the year, the fourth
quarter being virtually flat (Figure 1). The main
factor behind the slowdown was a progressive
weakening of exports
1 that ultimately affected
also domestic demand.
In particular, the growth of fixed investment
decelerated reflecting clouds in the business cli-
mate and a decline of capacity utilization. The
pessimism also showed up in a decline of stock
building in the second half of the year that fol-
lowed a strong increase in the first half. In
contrast, private consumption remained brisk
because real disposable incomes rose signifi-
cantly due to increasing employment and a
further reduction in consumer price inflation.
Contributing factors of the weakness of exports
have been the pronounced fall of demand from
Asia and Russia, that was not compensated by
rising demand from expanding regions like
North America, and the appreciation of Europe-
an currencies by some 4 percent in real effec-
tive terms until the end of the year. Since the
beginning of 1999, however, the euro has de-
preciated against major currencies.
The "exports" figures in the national accounts
published by Eurostat (1998) include intra-Euroland
trade. Own estimates (see Dopke et al. 1998b and
StrauB 1998) for exports based on individual coun-
tries' extra-Euroland trade suggest that exports to out-
side Euroland ("correct" exports) declined in the
fourth quarter while intra-Euroland trade was still ex-
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Meanwhile, the labor market continued to im-
prove. In the fourth quarter of 1998, the number
of persons employed was 1.5 percent higher
than one year before. The unemployment rate
decreased by 0.5 percentage points over the
second half of the year to a little less than
11 percent. Nevertheless, it is still higher than
in other industrial countries. The improvement
on the labor market spread to almost all EMU
member countries; the exception is Italy where
unemployment even rose slightly, reflecting slow
economic growth.
Inflation has moderated further. The increase
in consumer prices has reached its lowest level
in decades. It amounted to less than 1 percent at
the beginning of 1999 as measured by the Har-
monized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). The
continued slowdown of inflation was partly due
to a drop in energy prices by 4 percent over the
year, while the increase in service prices re-
mained roughly constant at 2 percent. There are
still large differences in the inflation rates among
EMU member countries. While in Germany and
France prices were approximately stable at ratesof less than 0.5 percent, other countries in a
more advanced stage of the business cycle re-
ported inflation rates of some 1.5 percent (Spain,
the Netherlands) or even more than 2 percent
(Ireland, Portugal).
2 The fall in producer prices
accelerated slightly to an annualized 3 percent
in the fourth quarter of 1998, also reflecting de-
clining unit labor costs.
II. Monetary Policy Stimulates
Economic Activity
The monetary conditions in Euroland have im-
proved continuously. Already on the way to
EMU, long-term interest rates converged at a
low level. In part, this was the result of a more
or less harmonized monetary policy aiming at
the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. But also
the divergence of real interest rates (the differ-
ence between nominal rates and the rate of in-
flation) became smaller. With the increasing
probability of EMU participation, the risk of
devaluation declined for those currencies that
had previously shown higher inflation (Lapp et
al. 1996: 259 ff.), and the risk disappeared alto-
gether after the decision on EMU membership
in May 1998. The convergence of bond yields
thus implied a reduction of real rates in the
formerly high interest rate countries. Over a
longer period (1986-1996), real rates were in
several cases about two percentage points
higher than in Germany (Table I).
3 To summar-
ize, the introduction of EMU itself led to an im-
pulse in a number of countries as the cost of fi-
nancing declined. Also, government budgets
were relieved since borrowing was possible at
lower real rates of interest.
A similar movement could be observed for
money market rates which are largely under the
control of central banks. In the past, there had
National headline inflation rates have differed to a
similar degree.
3 The average rates vary according to the estimation
period. The sample period chosen here can be justi-
fied because the cyclical position in 1986 was similar
to that in 1996. A time span over more than one cycle
is not possible due to the lack of data.
been considerable differences not only between
nominal but also between real rates in the mem-
ber countries; for example, the long-run average
for the three-month money market rate in Italy
was 6 % in real terms compared to less than
4 % in Germany. This reflects the lack of credi-
bility of several central banks in Europe. Be-
cause of the risk of devaluation, they had to
offer considerably higher interest rates. This
risk premium disappeared completely with the
introduction of the monetary union. In other
words: As real rates declined substantially in
countries of Southern Europe and in France —
in some cases, they are even lower now than in
Germany —, the impulse from monetary policy
increased. It is true, therefore, that the conver-
gence of interest rates alone — both long-term
and short-term — implied an improvement of
monetary conditions in those countries which
had previously experienced a higher risk of in-
flation and of devaluation.
4 For Euroland as a
whole, interest rates in general are currently
very low even if the historically low rate of infla-
tion is accounted for.
With the introduction of the euro on January
1,1999 the ECB took over the responsibility for
monetary policy. In December 1998, the na-
tional central banks had reduced the key interest
rate to a level of 3 % in a concerted action.
Since then, the three-month money market rate
has come down from 3.5 % to 3.1 % (Figure 2).
Long-term rates (ten-year bonds) recently stood
at 3.8 %. Corrected for inflation (HICP), the
real rate is approximately 3 %. This rate is
lower than the long-term average for Germany.
The harmonized money stock M3 increased at a
rate of 4.9 percent in January which is some-
what higher than the reference value of the ECB
for this aggregate; the narrow money stock Ml
expanded at a rate of some 10 percent. All these
figures on interest rates and money stocks show
that monetary conditions in Euroland are favor-
able. In addition, the euro devalued against the
dollar by about 8 percent between the beginning
of January and early March.
This would even be the case if the introduction of
EMU had led to higher inflationary expectations; this,
however, is not revealed by the development of





































































Source: OECD (1999); own calculations.
The difference between long-term and short-
term interest rates is, however, somewhat lower
than the long-term average for Germany. This is
often seen as an indication of a tight policy
stance. However, the term spread may not be a
reliable indicator in this situation because its
change is due to a fall in long-term rates and
not an increase of short rates due to a tightening
of monetary policy. The spread in Euroland has
narrowed since mid-1998 only because long-
term rates dropped faster than money market
rates. In addition, the decline in bond yields is
largely due to a shift of international investors
towards markets in Europe (safe haven effect).
This can hardly be seen as an indication of
more restrictive monetary conditions.
The term structure at the short end of interest
rates reveals the markets' expectations concern-
ing the interest rate policy of the ECB in the
near term. Since the rate for, say, the six-month
money market rate is somewhat lower than the
one-month rate, the market believes that the
ECB will cut interest rates soon. Obviously,
market participants assume that the ECB will
react to low inflation and the current weak eco-
nomic performance.
We do not share this view prevailing in
financial markets but expect that the ECB will
keep interest rates constant for a while. Indi-
cators of economic activity have stabilized and
suggest that the weakness is only transitory as
is expected by many observers including the
ECB. A further stimulation would therefore cre-
ate the risk of inflation. The expansion of M3
suggests that price increases will pick up soon,
anyway; currently, they are only suppressed by
special factors such as the decline of unit labor
costs and low import prices. The recent devalu-
ation of the euro is an expansionary factor as
well. Finally, the ECB has to establish a reputa-
tion at the beginning of the monetary union;
this means, among other things, that the central
bank takes the medium-term strategy that it has
chosen seriously and refrains from any attempts
to fine tune the economy. And, above all, the
ECB will not cut interest rates after the strong
pressure from governments, especially since the
national central banks cut interest rates last
December and were — according to the percep-
tion of many market participants — giving in to
political pressure. While key rates will remain
unchanged in 1999, we expect the ECB to raise
rates slightly next year because of the expected
strength of the economy and the pickup of raw
material prices. At the end of 2000, the three-
month money market rate will be approximately
0.5 percentage points higher than currently.
Long-term rates will increase slightly in 1999
and reach some 4 % at the end of this year.
They will go up further because, first, capital
will return to emerging markets and, second,
the economy will have gained momentum and
inflation will rise somewhat. The real external
value of the euro is assumed to remain constant
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III. Fiscal Policy on a Neutral
Course
Last year, the budget deficit relative to GDP in
Euroland continued to decline. However, com-
pared to 1997, when the deficit shrank to 2.5 per-
cent from 4.2 percent (1996), the reduction of
0.2 percentage points was minimal (Figure 3) in
light of the fact that economic growth was
strong in 1998; the increased revenues and re-
duced expenditures alone would have lowered
the deficit ratio by 0.4 percent.
5 In other words,
the structural deficit actually increased slightly.
It has to be noted, however, that the deficit in
1997 had been pushed down by one-off mea-
sures equivalent to 0.4 percent of GDP. All in all,
A reduction of the output gap by one percentage point
typically reduces the deficit ratio by a little more than
half a percentage point (Ddpke et al. 1998b: 20).
Given the estimate of 2.3 percent for the growth of
potential output, the observed increase of real GDP (3
percent) is equivalent to a decline of the output gap
by 0.7 and a reduction of the deficit ratio by 0.4








































Source: ECB (1999b); own calculations, estimations and forecasts.
progress in fiscal consolidation was small at
best in 1998. The considerable moves towards
consolidation registered in 1997 in the run-up
to EMU have obviously lost momentum.
Over the forecasting horizon, fiscal policy is
expected to stay on its neutral course. Tax mea-
sures and various expenditure programs aimed
primarily at improving the labor market will on
balance neither stimulate nor dampen demand.
According to the projections in the Stability and
Growth Programs, the deficit should decline
slightly. However, since real GDP growth is
likely to be lower than projected, the achieve-
ment of the planned deficit-to-GDP ratios would
necessitate additional measures to raise reve-
nues or to reduce expenditures. We do not ex-
pect such a tightening because governments
will want to avoid a procyclical stance of fiscal
policy in 1999. Instead, against the background
that there are no sanctions as long as the deficit
remains below 3 percent of GDP, governments
are likely to tolerate deficits that are higher than
projected. The budget deficit relative to GDP
will be stuck at slightly above 2 percent in both
1999 and 2000, and the debt-to-GDP ratio will
decline only marginally.
IV. Outlook: Recovery Resumes
For the immediate future, leading indicators
suggest that output will grow rather slowly due
mainly to the weakness of exports and corpo-
rate investment. The business climate, however,
seems to have bottomed out (Figure 1). At the
same time, the index of consumer sentiment
reached its highest level in the 1990s, and in
some countries, notably in France, it climbed to
all-time highs. Therefore, private consumption
can be expected to keep going strong.
Business expectations will start to improve
from spring onwards, and GDP growth will
gain momentum again (Table 2). The annual
growth rate for 1999 will amount to 2 percent,
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Source: Eurostat (1998); ECB (1999b); OECD (1998a); own calculations and estimates.
Figure 4: GDP, Domestic Demand and Net Exports in Euroland, 1992-2000
Percent
Forecast
1992:1 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
aAt constant prices. — ^Percentage change over previous year. —
 cChange of net exports over previous
year in percent of GDP in the same quarter of previous year.
Source: Eurostat (1998); own calculations and forecasts.
ginning of the year, In the year 2000, output
growth will accelerate to 2.7 percent which is a
little more than the growth rate of potential out-
put.
6
We do not assume a major impact of the Y2K prob-
lem ("millennium bug"). Possible frictions are expec-
ted to be short-lived.
Domestic demand will lead the recovery,
stimulated by favorable monetary conditions
(Figure 4). At the same time, fiscal policy is on
a neutral course. Investment in machinery and
equipment is projected to pick up gradually
owing to the low cost of financing and improv
ing capacity utilization. Private consumption will10
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of Consumer Prices (HICP). —
Source: ECB (1999b); OECD (1998a); own calculations and estimates.
continue to display robust growth. However, no
further acceleration can be expected because of
reduced increases in employment and in real
"disposable incomes.
In the course of this year, exports will in-
creasingly contribute to demand growth given
the improvement of the situation in Asia and the
brightening of the prospects of the United King-
dom economy (Gern et al. 1999). Meanwhile,
the strong growth in the United States is likely
to slow down some-what, and in Japan the re-
cession will bottom out. The euro is assumed to
stay at around its present level in real terms.
Consumer prices will remain subdued for the
time being, mainly due to the decrease in im-
port prices reflecting low raw material prices. In
the course of this year, however, raw material
prices are likely to gradually recover adding to
the upward pressure on prices due to an acceler-
ation in wages and rising demand. As a conse-
quence, the rate of inflation will pick up slightly
to 1.5 percent next year, following close to 1
percent in 1999 (Table 3).
V. Medium-term Orientation of
the ECB
The ECB has decided not to follow the strategy
of monetary targeting or inflation targeting in
the strict sense. While the prominent role of the
money stock is stressed, the ECB does not an-
nounce a target for money growth; instead, a
reference path is defined. In doing this, the cen-
tral bank follows the procedure the Deutsche
Bundesbank has chosen in the past when deriv-
ing the target. Accordingly, the ECB defines the
rate of M3 growth as compatible with target in-
flation of 1.5 percent
7 by assuming a trend
growth of output of 2 to 2.5 percent and a trend
decline of velocity by 0.5 to 1 percent. The role
of money is therefore assumed to be the anchor
for the price level ("Inflation is ultimately a
monetary phenomenon," as stated by the ECB
(1999a: 47)). As there may be some problems
in the period of transition — e.g. money de-
mand may show some instability —, the ECB
did not announce a target band for money
According to the ECB, price level stability is achieved
if the annual increase in the HICP is below 2 percent.
This, however, is the upper limit and should not be
taken as the target. Following statements by members
of the Governing Council, the target can be assumed
to be 1.5 percent.11
growth. This could have led to speculations that
the ECB would definitely change interest rates
if the money stock is outside the corridor. In
practice, however, there will not be major dif-
ferences between announcing a corridor and a
reference value because the ECB will also ana-
lyze the situation should M3 growth deviate
substantially from the announced rate, and de-
cide whether monetary policy actions are neces-
sary. The Bundesbank behaved in a similar
fashion in the past when monetary targets were
not hit.®
The ECB does also not follow a strict infla-
tion targeting. A key element of this strategy is
a forecast of inflation on the basis of a macro-
economic model which then — should pre-
dicted inflation deviate from its target — leads
to expansionary or restrictive measures. The
ECB does not present such a model and also
does not publish its forecast.
9 In this sense, its
policy is less transparent for the public than en-
visaged in the inflation targeting strategy. Never-
theless, there will not be much of a difference in
practice. The ECB will — as most other central
banks — use a large number of indicators in
order to assess the perspectives for inflation.
The ECB (1999a: 49 f.) mentions an enormous
number of variables which could lead to the im-
pression that the central bank "looks at every-
thing", i.e. a great many indicators are used for
its judgment as is the case in many macroeco-
nometric models.
Although the ECB has not made a clear de-
cision in favor of monetary targeting or infla-
tion targeting, there will hardly be any differ-
ence with respect to the policy of the Deutsche
Bundesbank or the Bank of England in terms of
the overall targets. In the past, no central bank
has ever followed a strict strategy of any type.
For example, the Deutsche Bundesbank has not
solely used the announced money targets as a
reference for policy actions.
Although the ECB will look at many va-
riables to assess the outlook for inflation, the
statements can be interpreted in such a way that
it intends to follow a medium-term strategy,
oriented at potential output (ECB 1999a). This
strategy is incompatible with a fine tuning of
the economy or with an influence of current in-
flation on policy decisions; this can be the case
only indirectly if money demand changes and,
thus, if there is a deviation of money growth
from the target. The main reason for such a pol-
icy strategy is that economic theory as well as
experience have shown that a policy of fine tun-
ing is not possible.
1
0 For that to work, any de-
viation from the output target or the inflation
target would require a clear identification of the
causes; the size and kind of the shocks (perma-
nent or transitory?) must be known, and one has
to know exactly how the change in policy in-
struments will affect the target variables. As the
knowledge of all these necessary requirements
does not exist, central banks have more and
more moved away from an activist policy which




The ECB, too, has decided to follow a me-
dium-term strategy. This policy will by itself
help to stabilize economic activity, i.e., a pro-
longed weakness as well as an overheating of
the economy will be avoided. For example, an
acceleration of inflation is unlikely which
would cause a monetary tightening and a subse-
quent recession (Scheide 1998); also, the stra-
tegy prevents deflationary tendencies.
VI. No Reason to Cut Interest
Rates
Applied to the current debate about the interest
rate policy, all this means that the sluggishness
in Euroland is no reason for the ECB to act. The
° The Bundesbank also did not react in a mechanistic
fashion if the target was not met. For example, in
1994 it lowered interest rates although M3 was con-
siderably above the target.
" In contrast, the Bank of England regularly publishes
an "Inflation Report" in which the outlook for infla-
tion is described.
1
0 This is the essence of Friedman (1968) and Lucas
(1976).
1
1 Of course, the medium-term strategy of monetary tar-
geting also rests on certain conditions, e.g. the stabili-
ty of money demand.12
fact that inflation is low does not change this
conclusion. Currently, consumer prices increase
only slightly due to special factors, in particular
the weakness of raw material prices and the
consequent decline of import prices and not be-
cause monetary policy has been tight. If the
central bank reacted to this transitory change by
cutting interest rates, they would have to be
raised again as soon as this effect fades away.
In order to avoid such a stop-and-go policy, the
ECB should refrain from activism especially
since changes of import prices do not have a
lasting impact on the overall price level. At the
same time, the recent weakness of the euro




It does not make much sense to raise interest
rates when oil prices are rising or to lower rates
when oil prices are falling.
1
3 Therefore, the ECB
should focus more on the "core rate," which
excludes very volatile prices (e.g. for food and
energy) which are affected by special factors
(speculation, weather impact etc.). The core rate
of inflation is currently not far away from the
ECB's target inflation rate of 1.5 percent. This
rate is compatible with the observed rate of
monetary expansion, i.e., in the medium term,
the inflation rate in Euroland will average 1.5
percent if money growth is consistent with the
reference path of the ECB. Finally, the core rate
is also closer to the present forecasts for Euro-
land; the current low inflation rate is not as-
sumed to prevail in the near future.
An explicit short-run orientation is recom-
mended by the rule proposed by John Taylor.
According to this strategy, the central bank
should lower (raise) interest rates if actual infla-
tion is lower (higher) than the target and if real
GDP is lower (higher) than trend GDP (Box).
1
2 Scheide and Solveen (1998) propose that the ECB
should neglect exchange rate movements. — How-
ever, some politicians and economists have recently
proposed target zones once again; if they were estab-
lished, the ECB would probably have to raise interest
rates soon or the US Fed would have to lower rates in
spite of the booming US economy.
1
3 The same argument holds for changes in indirect
taxes. Hardly anyone would propose that the central
bank should tighten its policy because the value ad-
ded tax or the tax on gasoline is raised.
This rule is, in a sense, compatible with the me-
dium-term orientation as it suggests a neutral
course when the output gap is zero and if actual
inflation coincides with target inflation. On the
basis of the rule, the neutral rate of interest
would be 4.5 %. This rate will most likely be
achieved in the medium term if inflation is 1.5
percent. However, the rule proposes a stronger
activism of monetary policy in reaction to infla-
tion and economic activity. But even if the
Taylor Rule were pursued, there would be no
need to cut interest rates now, because the
money market rate — presently standing at
3.1 % — is not only lower than the neutral rate
but also lower than the rate suggested by the
Taylor Rule.
All this implies that the low interest rates are
already supporting economic activity in
Euroland. If a further reduction is suggested, it
must be assumed that either the equilibrium real
rate of interest is lower than 3 % — there is no
indication for this
1
4 — or that the output gap is
actually much bigger. Such an assumption
would imply that Euroland is in a recession and
that, for example, unemployment is to a
considerable degree of a cyclical nature. For
example, interest rates would, according to the
rule, be one percentage point lower if the output
gap was two percentage points higher than
assumed in the calculation (Box). However,
there is ample evidence provided by most
national research institutions and international
organizations that unemployment is mostly
structural and that the output gap is relatively
small.
Estimates of the equilibrium real rate of interest
naturally have a big margin of error. Lucas (1996:
666) is extremely critical with respect to the possible
link between interest rates and inflation in general:
"Central banks and even some monetary economists
talk knowledgeably of using high interest rates to
control inflation, but I know of no evidence from
even one economy linking these variables in a useful
way ...". In this connection, the statement in the
Monthly Bulletin of the ECB (1999a: 17) is dubious:
"... the view of the Governing Council ... that a level
of 3 % is appropriate in the foreseeable future as it
best serves the maintenance of price stability over the
medium term." — There is no empirical basis for
such a statement.13
Box: A Modified Taylor Rule
The Taylor Rule for an interest rate policy is described as follows:
[1] i = 7i + r + O.5(7t-Jt*)-O.5(;y*-;y)
where i: money market rate
TV. core inflation
71*: target inflation
r: equilibrium real money market rate
y: real GDP
y*: trend real GDP
The reaction coefficient for the deviations from the targets n* and y* are usually 0.5. This version differs slightly from the
commonly used versions because the core rate is included instead of the actual inflation rate. In general, the equilibrium real rate
must be estimated. This is not a trivial task, and any errors may lead to substantial deviations from the inflation target (Scheide
1998: 10 f.). The estimation for Euroland is especially problematic because before the monetary union, real interest rates were
biased upwards due to special risk premia. Therefore, the average rate prevailing in Germany is used as an approximation. During
the past 25 years, it amounted to about 3 % —just as for the United States. Furthermore, an estimate for the output gap is needed.
The numbers provided by various institutions vary. At the upper end of the spectrum, the OECD estimate is slightly above 1
percent.
a Given these values for the real rate of interest and the output gap, the rule implies a money market rate of almost 4 %.
aOther methods lead to lower estimates, i.e., the money market rate according to the rule would be higher. See Dopke et al.
(1998b: 10 ff.).
VII. Stability and Growth
Programs: Consolidation
Remains Inadequate
In the summer of 1997, the Stability and
Growth Pact was ratified in order to secure that
governments pursue fiscal policies in line with
the ideas of the Maastricht Treaty also after
EMU had started. The Stability and Growth
Pact requires that governments aim for balanced
budgets or even a surplus over the business
cycle. As an instrument to enforce sustainable
fiscal policies, a mechanism was introduced
that threatens to impose sanctions if the budget
deficit exceeds 3 percent of GDP.
1
5 In addition,
it was determined that the governments submit
to the European Commission and the Council
medium-term projections of the fiscal develop-
ments, so-called Stability and Growth Pro-
grams. On the basis of these programs, fiscal
policies are to be evaluated with respect to their





For a critical discussion of the sanction mechanism in
the Stability and Growth Pact see Scheide and
Solveen (1997: 15-17).
EU countries that are not members of the currency
union also have to submit programs in order to
review the convergence process.
Now the first reports have been submitted by
all countries. They contain projections for the
years until 2002 and are supposed to be updated
annually.
1
7 Table 4 presents key figures of the
programs. In Finland and Ireland, the budgets
were in surplus already last year. Apart from
these countries, only Spain plans a balanced
budget. In the other countries, the budget deficit
as a share of GDP is projected to decline to
around 1 percent; the Austrian government ex-
plicitly views 1.5 percent as being sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the Stability and
Growth Pact (Bundesministerium fiir Finanzen
1998: 8). The resulting deficit for Euroland as a
whole is 0.9 percent in 2002, compared to
2.3 percent in 1998.
Fiscal consolidation is defined as a reduction
of the structural, i.e. cyclically adjusted, deficit.
Therefore, it is adequate to focus on the evolu-
tion of the structural budget balance. Most of
the governments assume higher GDP growth
than has been achieved in the recent past and
also higher than what is generally estimated to
be the growth rate of potential output. Accord-
ingly, in these countries, structural deficits de-
cline by less than the headline deficits. Further-
17 The Stability and Growth Programs of Italy and
Ireland only cover the period until 2001.14
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 eCautious scenario. The Stability
government includes three different scenarios based on average annual GDP growth of
Source: OECD (1998b); Stability and Growth Programs of various countries; own calculations and estimates.
more, these projections seem to be optimistic in
light of recent developments that led to a sub-
stantial downward revision of GDP growth for
the current year. Consequently, there is a high
probability that even the modest targets en-
visaged in the programs will be missed.
The development of the budget deficit is only
one dimension in the evaluation of fiscal pol-
icies. Another important aspect is whether con-
solidation is achieved by restraining expendi-
tures or by raising taxes. Consolidation via the
revenue side lowers growth because higher
taxes and contributions dampen capital accumu-
lation and work effort. Experience shows that a
consolidation that relies on expenditure reduc-




In all countries for which relevant informa-
tion has been made available, the planned in-
crease in public expenditures is projected to be
smaller than GDP growth. Thus, the share of
public expenditures in GDP is envisaged to fall,
if slightly in some cases (Table 5). In a number
18 It has to be noted, however, that it is also important
which kind of expenditures are cut. Decreasing public
consumption is the preferable option as compared to
reducing public investment (Alesina and Perotti
1997). In Euroland, most countries have cut public in-
vestment considerably while other expenditures (pub-
lic consumption, subsidies, and transfers) continued
to rise in relation to GDP (OECD 1998b: 152).
of countries, notably Ireland, Finland, the
Netherlands, and Italy, this follows a significant
reduction in the expenditures-to-GDP ratio be-
tween 1994 and 1998 that has resulted in con-
siderable fiscal consolidation. General govern-
ment revenues (relative to GDP) have increased
in recent years in many countries in the course
of bringing budget deficits down below 3 per-
cent. In the period until 2002, the revenue-to-
GDP ratio is generally projected to decline gra-
dually. Thus, with respect to the structure of
consolidation, the policies as reflected in the
Stability and Growth Programs are a move into
the right direction. The policies actually pur-
sued, however, raise concern that the realization
of the projections is unlikely in some cases. For
this year and next, a significant reduction of the
share of public expenditure in GDP cannot be




The Maastricht Treaty requires fiscal policies
to be sustainable. Sustainability is indicated by
a primary budget surplus high enough to sta-
bilize the debt-to-GDP ratio (Buiter 1985,
Blanchard et al. 1990). Comparing the projec-
ted debt ratio in 2002 (Italy and Ireland: 2001)
with the debt ratio in 1998 reveals that this is the
19 For a discussion of the fiscal policy in Germany, see
Boss etal. (1999).15






























































































Source: OECD (1998b); Stability and Growth Programs of various countries; own calculations and estimates.
case for every single country. However, there
are significant differences: While in some
countries (Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands) the
debt ratio is declining rapidly, in others only
minor progress is projected. The latter is true
especially for the large economies Germany and
France; consequently, the fiscal policies as laid
out in the Stability and Growth Programs do not
lead to a marked reduction of the debt-to-GDP
ratio in Euroland as a whole. Gross public debt
relative to GDP will remain significantly above
60 percent.
Summing up, the current course of fiscal pol-
icy in Euroland does not comply with the prin-
ciples of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact to a sufficient degree, mainly
due to limited consolidation efforts in the major
member states. Even slow progress is contin-
gent on a rather benign macroeconomic envi-
ronment. In contrast, in some of the smaller
countries consolidation has progressed remark-
ably.
VIII. Tax Competition Instead of
Tax Harmonization in the EU
After the introduction of the Euro, it has often
been argued that fiscal policy in the EMU or
even in the EU should be more coordinated.
Facing the high degree of capital mobility,
harmonization of capital income taxes is often
viewed as necessary. In particular, it has been
argued that the differences between value added
tax (VAT) rates (Table 6) hamper the integra-
tion of the markets and distort competition.
The EU Commission — supported by the go-
vernments of many member countries — has
proposed a new VAT system (Mueller 1996).
The main elements are a kind of smoothing the
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(e.g. sales of newspapers in
Belgium and Denmark) combined with a credit for the tax
included in the purchases. — "Weighted by 1997 GDP shares.
Source: DATEV (1999); own calculations.16
VAT rate differentials prevailing in the Euro-
pean Union, the abolition of the tax borders
(shifted into the firms in 1993) and the intro-
duction of a clearing mechanism in order to
compensate those countries which lose tax re-




If the tax borders were abolished, i.e., if the
invoice method of value added taxation was
realized across the borders of the EU countries,
trade flows would not be influenced given the
present tax rates. However, the distribution of
VAT revenues among the EU countries would
change. Countries with net exports would gain,
net importers would lose revenues. At the same
time, high tax rate countries would benefit
whereas low rate countries would lose tax reve-
nues. By raising the VAT rate, every country
could exploit the other countries; because of the
taxation of exports an increase of the VAT rate
would result in higher revenues without (due to
the invoice method) affecting exports, whereas
tax revenues of the import country would de-
cline. According to the proposal of the EU
Commission, these consequences on the distri-
bution of the VAT revenues among the coun-
tries are to be avoided by a clearing mechanism
and by a harmonization of taxes.
2
1
The introduction of the system advocated by
the EU Commission and by most of the govern-
ments in the EU would not enforce tax competi-
tion. This would be the case, however, if the
origin principle of value added taxation
2
2 and a
general (including a cross-border) subtraction
method instead of the invoice method was in-
troduced (Boss 1989). According to this sys-
tem, the difference between sales and purchases
of a firm is taxed by the rate decided upon by a
single country, and there is no adjustment of tax
2
0 In the relation to non-EU countries nothing has to be
changed.
If the shift of tax revenues were to be compensated
exactly, the clearing authority would need exactly the
same data which are currently necessary in order to
control the tax declarations of the firms. As to
administration, especially the firms would not realize
lower costs. The main effect of introducing the Com-
mission's system might easily be the creation of a
new European bureaucracy (Homburg 1997: 306).
2
2 In the political discussion, the term "origin principle"
is erroneously used to characterize the system pro-
posed by the EU Commission.
rates if goods and services are exported or im-
ported. Whereas the existing VAT system is
based on the destination principle, the new sys-
tem is a VAT system characterized by the origin
principle (correctly understood); the value ad-
ded (excluding investment expenditures) is
taxed. A country receives tax revenues if pro-
duction takes place in that country. Net export
(import) countries would realize higher (lower)
tax revenues. Such a distribution would be
equivalent to what the term "value added" ac-
tually implies.
At first glance, the introduction of the origin
principle would diminish the competitiveness of
high-tax countries, whereas low-tax countries
would gain. But wages and prices in the indivi-
dual countries can be expected to react — al-
though possibly with a lag; the consequence is
an unchanged competitive position of each of
the countries.
2
3 Insofar as wages in high-tax
countries are not lowered or are reduced only
sluggishly, unemployment would rise perma-
nently or temporarily.
Applying the origin principle, every country
would be able to reduce the VAT rate in order
to become attractive as a location of production.
Due to competition, the VAT rates on average
presumably would be smaller than in the case of
harmonization. In addition, the tax rates might
come closer to the benefits that firms have as a
result of government activities in each of the
countries. Finally, competition might be advan-
tageous because every country would be free to
find its optimal tax rate structure.
Competition between countries with respect
to capital income taxation is often seen to be
even more harmful than VAT competition.
Facing an increasing degree of capital mobility,
it has been argued that a "race to the bottom" is
taking place;
2
4 competition even would become
more intensive and possibly might only come to
an end when the capital income tax rates are
2
3 In technical terms: The "real exchange rates" within
EMU would be unchanged after the adjustment to the
new system; in relation to non-EMU countries, nomi-
nal exchange rates would also have to change in order
to have constant real exchange rates.
2
4 Assessing the attractiveness of a location of produc-
tion, the effective rate of taxation is important; it de-
pends not only on the tax rate but also on the defini-
tion of the tax base (e.g. the depreciation rules) and
the importance of other taxes.17
zero. This would mean that the governments
would not be able to fulfill their functions suffi-
ciently or at all. Especially, there might be an
inefficient supply of public goods or the welfare
state might be eroded by the market forces. For
constant or declining government expenditures,
the tax burden would have to be shifted to the
immobile factors of production, especially to
labor; this would hinder — given the high or
even increasing rates of contributions to social
security — the decrease of unemployment in
the EU.
The question is whether the "race to the bot-
tom" feared by many observers would actually
occur. The corporate income tax rates which are
at the center of the discussion about the neces-
sity of tax rate harmonization declined in the
1985-1992 period in most of the EU countries
(as well as in other industrialized countries);
thereafter the tax burden on average did not
change. The share of taxes on corporate income
(in the OECD definition) in total tax revenues
declined in only two countries (Germany and
France) in the 1980-1996 period (Table 7); in
the EU on the whole, the share — and the rela-
tion of taxes on corporate income to GDP —
even increased somewhat. All in all, there are
only weak indications of what is called a "race
to the bottom" in the EU.
Nevertheless, there are strong efforts to har-
monize capital income taxation and to create
"fair" tax competition in the EU. The EU Com-
mission proposed a "model of coexistence" for
taxing interest income (Mueller 1998). This
means that the EU countries have to either with-
hold a 20 percent minimum tax on interest in-
come (including zero bonds and euro bonds)
earned by foreigners or to inform the foreign
tax authorities about the interest income paid.
Obviously, the proposal aims at strengthen-
ing the residence principle of interest income
taxation. Using the residence principle is effi-
cient if really enforced;
2
5 savings would be al-
located — as to the EU region — without tax
distortions because income from abroad would
be taxed in the same way as domestic income.
2
5 Otherwise, taxation according to the residence prin-
ciple is similar to a taxation according to the source
principle which implies a reduction of tax rates in
order to attract mobile capital.
In addition, capital income taxation is adequate
in a system of comprehensive income taxation.
However, taxing interest income means that
savings are discriminated. If the tax rate on in-
terest income in the EU on average goes up as a
consequence of implementing the Commis-
sion's proposal, the extent of discrimination in-
creases. Anyway, the realization of the proposal
would mean a step away from a system of
taxing consumption which presumably has to
be preferred to a system of basically taxing in-
come. Of course, a tax on consumption also
leads to distortions of economic decisions, but
savers are not punished. In addition, capital
might flow abroad because tax rates on interest
income are smaller in non-EU countries; even-
tually, private households would emigrate.
It is open to doubt if the proposal will really
be decided upon; the decision has to be reached
unanimously. Luxembourg wants to combine
the decision with a new legislation on taxes on
dividends and on tax oasis; some countries
think that the 20 percent rate is too high. There
will be quarrels on the distribution of the addi-
tional revenues arising if tax revenues increase
after the introduction of the new regime. The
system of introducing a minimum withholding
tax would create an additional problem. Each
non-taxing or low-taxing country could increase
revenues by raising the rate up to the level
which is relevant in the residence country; the
tax would be completely offset in the residence
country. The probability that such a conse-
quence would be accepted by every country
seems to be small; by the way, the exploitation
by other countries might be small or nil if the
average tax rate on interest income was raised
in the process of harmonization.
Unrelated to the detailed plans of the EU
Commission, the question is whether tax
harmonization makes sense in a world of high
and/or increasing capital mobility (Kitterer
1995). If the tax rates are reduced by the
countries' efforts to attract mobile factors of
production, the governments are forced to cut
expenditures. Inefficiencies in the public sector
would decrease, subsidies for ailing industries
would possibly be cut. Tax reductions and ex-
penditure cuts would foster economic growth
and employment (Heitger 1998).18
Table 7: Taxes on Corporate Income
a as Percentage of
GDP and of Total Tax Revenues in European Countries,




























































































































































































Competition between governments does not
exclude the supply of infrastructure by the
states. Insofar as the governments provide ser-
vices for firms, the marginal productivity of ca-
pital is affected and taxation of firms is pos-
sible. Thus, there is a lower bound for the fall
of tax rates (Siebert 1990). It is defined by the
value of the services that the governments offer
(e.g. by infrastructure). The level of taxation
will not fall short of the marginal costs of infra-
structure even in the case of perfect capital mo-
bility (BMWi 1994: 65). Tax competition would
end in a system of benefit taxation in this sense,
not in zero taxation. There are different views
on the question if under such circumstances tax
revenues would be sufficient to finance the
governments' expenditures for infrastructure
(H.-W. Sinn 1997; Blankart 1996). It is argued
that there would be a problem especially in the
case of increasing returns to scale in using the
services; there are doubts that supply would
then be efficient. However, this case does not
seem to be very important.
2
6
Tax competition does not necessarily lead to
an erosion of the welfare state; only the ineffi-
ciently designed systems of social security are
endangered (SVR 1998). Facing the high levels
of government expenditures in many countries,
it seems improbable that —^ even in the case of
enforced tax competition — an underprovision
of public goods or an erosion of the welfare
state are around the corner. Competition be-
tween governments helps to find better solu-
tions of economic policy problems (S. Sinn
1990). It may lead to better economic results
and to a process of learning from other
countries. Competition can be understood as a
process of discovery in the sense of Hayek
(Hayek 1968). It could be useful in the field of
fiscal policy, too; especially it might help to
find a better tax system.
Source: OECD (1998: 84).
Many services provided by the public sector do not
share the characteristics of public goods; they are
private goods in an economic sense (BMWi 1994: 66;
Blankart 1996).References
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